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h i g h l i g h t s
• We examine wage expectations in a model of unemployment and reservation wages.
• Wemodel unemployment, reservation wages and expected wages simultaneously.
• Wage expectations are identified via an exogenous policy shock.
• The policy shock increases expected wages.
• Expected wages are positively associated with reservation wages.
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a b s t r a c t
Wemodel unemployment duration, reservation and expectedwages simultaneously for individuals not in
work, where wage expectations are identified via an exogenous policy shock. The policy shock increased
expected wages, which were found to be positively associated with reservation wages.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction and background
The reservation wage, the lowest wage at which an individual
is willing to work, plays a key role in labour market analysis. An
extensive empirical literature exists on the relationship between
reservationwages and unemployment, with seminal contributions
by Lancaster and Chesher (1983) and Jones (1988). Empirical
evidence supports a positive relationship between reservation
wages and unemployment duration. More recently, Hogan (2004)
focuses on the influence of previous wages on reservation wages.
We expand this line of enquiry by incorporating ‘forward-looking’
information, namely wage expectations, into the reservation
wage-setting process. The role of expected wages has not been
the focus of empirical scrutiny yet expected wages arguably signal
information regarding expected future labour market prospects.
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2. Data
We use individual-level data from the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), a nationally-representative random sample survey
of each adult member from more than 5000 private households
(www.iser.essex.ac.uk/survey/bhps). Given data availability, we
focus on the 1996–2002 waves. 1 In the BHPS, if the respondent
‘is not currently working but has looked for work or has not looked for
work in last four weeks but would like a job’, he/she is asked: ‘What
is the lowest weekly take home pay you would consider accepting for
a job?’ Individuals are then asked: ‘About howmany hours in a week
would you expect to have to work for that pay?’ We construct hourly
reservationwages.2 Job seekerswere asked: ‘About howmany hours
1 Due to changes in the tax credit system in 2003, discussed further below, our
sample ends in 2002.
2 Given the reference to ‘take home pay’, we assume respondents refer to net
(i.e. after tax) wages.
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in a week do you think you would be able to work?’ Individuals are
then asked about expected wages: ‘What weekly take-home pay
would you expect to get (for that)?’ From the responses,we construct
hourly expected wages.
The sample is unbalanced with 3034 observations, where, on
average, individuals are in the panel for two years. The sample
includesworking age individuals (18–65)who satisfy the Lancaster
and Chesher (1983) rationality restriction: unemployment benefit
income is less than or equal to reservation wages, which are less
than or equal to expected wages.3 Out of the sample of individuals
who are currently not working and who state that they have
looked for work or have not looked for work in the last four weeks
but would like a job, 62% are typically classified as ‘economically
inactive’.4 We include these individuals in the sample if they
report a reservation wage, since they are arguably signalling
labour market attachment, which accords with the argument that
the distinction between the unemployed and inactive may not
be as clear-cut as previously assumed (Blackaby et al., 2007).
The distributions of the natural logarithm of reservation wages
and expected wages are presented in Fig. 1. The mean log
hourly reservation wage and expected wage are 1.44 and 1.55,
respectively.
3. The determinants of reservation wages
Following Jones (1988), we estimate a system of two simulta-
neous equations to allow for the joint determination of reservation
wages and unemployment duration5:
log(t)it = X1itβ + γ log(rw)it + ε1it
log(rw)it = X2itφ + λ log(t)it + ε2it
(1)
where i and t denote the individual and time period, respectively,
log(t) is the log duration of the number of days not being in work,
log(rw) is log hourly reservation wages, X1 and X2 are vectors of
explanatory variables, β and φ are parameters to be estimated,
γ and λ measure the elasticity of unemployment duration with
respect to reservation wages and the elasticity of reservation
wages with respect to unemployment duration, and the ε’s are
random error terms. Following the existing literature, X1 and X2
include: gender, ethnicity, marital status, educational attainment,
regional unemployment rate, age, being currently unemployed
rather than ‘economically inactive’, year, interview month, and
job search intensity.6 To identify unemployment duration, X2 also
includes: log unemployment benefit, the log of all other types
of benefit, the log of pay in last job, working spouse, number
of children under 16, and number of dependent children aged
16–19. Our set of over-identifying instruments follows the existing
literature (e.g. Jones, 1988) and satisfies the standard instrument
validity tests.7
The results are summarised in Table 1, where we only show
the key coefficients. Column 1 (2) presents the unemployment
duration (reservation wage) equation. Unemployment duration is
3 4% of the sample fail to meet this condition.
4 The ‘economically inactive’ include: individuals involved in family care, full
time students, the long term sick/disabled, and individuals in government training.
In the BHPS, 20% of those typically classified as ‘economically’ inactive specify a
reservation wage.
5 In the BHPS, unemployment duration reflects a current rather than completed
spell of unemployment as recorded at the interview date.
6 Job search is an index of the number of types of search activity undertaken.
7 Following Mundlak (1978), to allow for individual time-invariant, i.e. fixed
effects, we include individual-level mean characteristics of time varying covariates
throughout.
Fig. 1. Distributions of log reservation wages and log expected wages.
Table 1
2SLS model of unemployment duration and reservation wages.
Duration Res. wage
COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Log(unemployment duration) −0.836 (2.46)
Log(reservation wage) 1.948 (2.97)
Regional UE rate 0.053 (1.61) −0.012 (1.95)
Job search −0.154 (4.00) 0.001 (0.07)
Log(UE benefits) −0.327 (1.84)
Log(other benefits) −0.065 (1.83)
Log(pay last job) 0.080 (2.39)
Chi squared [p value] 1128.33 [0.000] 532.47 [0.000]
Observations 3034
positively related to the regional unemployment rate, although
only at the 10% level. The results also suggest that job search
decreases the length of time not in work. The elasticity of
unemployment duration with respect to reservation wages is
positive and statistically significant and is similar in magnitude to
that reported in existing studies. A higher regional unemployment
rate is associated with lower reservation wages. Whilst the
elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to reservation
wages is elastic, the elasticity of reservation wages with respect
to unemployment duration, in accordance with the existing
literature, is inelastic and negative at −0.84.
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Table 2
3SLS model of unemployment duration, reservation wages and expected wages.
Specification 1 Specification 2
Duration Res. wage Exp. wage Duration Res. wage Exp. wage
COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT
Log(unemployment duration) −0.805 (3.68) −0.517 (3.52)
Log(reservation wage) 1.858 (2.94) 1.841 (1.93)
Log(expected wage) 1.479 (5.34) 1.488 (8.62)
WFTC eligible 0.047 (3.18)
WFTC eligible year 1 0.046 (3.11)
WFTC eligible year 2 0.051 (1.71)
WFTC eligible year 3 0.017 (0.31)
Regional UE rate 0.026 (0.78) 0.016 (3.17) 0.025 (0.75) 0.015 (3.58)
Job search −0.161 (4.19) −0.009 (0.97) −0.161 (4.19) −0.005 (0.72)
Log(UE benefits) 0.414 (2.71) 0.260 (2.36)
Log(other benefits) 0.009 (3.53) 0.056 (3.48)
Log(pay last job) 0.077 (3.56) 0.004 (2.09) 0.051 (3.52) 0.005 (2.12)
Chi squared [p value] 1067.53 [0.000] 5209.43 [0.000] 754.70 [0.000] 1064.35 [0.000] 7970.17 [0.000] 744.87 [0.000]
AIC (BIC) 16,335.65 (16,979.54) 14,469.28 (15,119.19)
Observations 3034
4. Reservation wages and expected wages
Arguably, reservation wages, expected wages and unemploy-
ment duration are jointly-determined outcomes: Lancaster and
Chesher (1983) argue that job seekers might revise reservation
wages as expected wages fluctuate. We now allow for such joint
determination by allowing expected wages to influence reserva-
tion wages directly and unemployment duration indirectly via
reservation wages. To identify the three-equation system, we ar-
gue that the introduction of an unexpected change in labour mar-
ket policy acts as an exogenous shock, impacting on expected
wages. We focus on the introduction of Working Family Tax Cred-
its (WFTCs).8 If the policy change is unexpected then a shift in the
expected net income distribution is predicted.
We estimate a three-equation system as follows9:
log(t)it = X1itβ + γ log(rw)it + ε1it
log(rw)it = X2itφ + λ log(t)it + ε2it
log(ew)it = X3itη + ϕWFTCit + ε3it .
(2)
X3 contains covariates associated with Mincerian wage equations:
gender, ethnicity, marital status, educational attainment, age, and
wages from their last job. We also condition on WFTC eligibility
in the expected wage equation, which acts as an exclusion
restriction to identify the parameters of the reservation wage
equation. Initially, we define the exogenous policy shock as a
binary indicator denoting eligibility in any year from1999 onwards
(‘specification 1’); and second, as three binary indicators capturing
the first, second, or third year of eligibility (‘specification 2’).
From an economic perspective, ‘specification 2’ is our preferred
specification given that we expect the effect of WFTC eligibility
to differ across the first, second and third year of eligibility with
its effect expected to be largest at the first year of eligibility and
dissipating thereafter, in accordance with individuals becoming
more informed about labour market conditions once WFTC
eligibility is taken into account. The exclusion restrictions used to
identify the parameters of the unemployment duration equation
are as in Eq. (1).
Table 2 presents the results: column 1 presents the unemploy-
ment duration equation and columns 2 and 3 present the reserva-
tion wage equation and expected wage equation, respectively. In
8 WFTCs almost doubled the generosity of previous in-work benefits associated
with Family Credits, encouraging individuals on benefit into employment. Eligibility
depends on hours of work, the number of dependent children and capital (Brewer
et al., 2006). In 2003, the WFTC system changed, hence our sample ends in 2002.
9 We incorporate Mundlak fixed effects as in Section 3.
‘specification 1’, WFTC eligibility has a statistically significant pos-
itive influence on expected wages, of approximately 5% points.10
The elasticity of reservation wages with respect to expected wages
is positive and elastic. Benefit income has a positive impact on
reservation wages. A one percent increase in unemployment ben-
efits is associated with a higher reservation wage of 0.4% points.
This finding is similar to the upper range found by Addison et al.
(2010).
There has been a moderate decrease in the elasticity of
unemployment duration with respect to reservation wages from
1.95 to 1.86 and an increase in the elasticity of reservation wages
with respect to unemployment duration from −0.84 to −0.81.
An increase in reservation wages by 1% reduces the duration of
unemployment by around 1.9% points. The key elasticities between
reservation wages and unemployment duration are robust to
the alternative definition of WFTC eligibility in specification 2.
Both the Akaike’s and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criteria,
AIC and BIC respectively in Table 2, reveal that specification 2
is the preferred model statistically. WFTC eligibility only has a
statistically significant association with expected wages during
the first year of eligibility, consistent with individuals becoming
more informed about labour market conditions once the ‘surprise’
element of the policy change has been taken into account.
5. Conclusion
Although expectedwages play an important role in labourmar-
ket analysis, to our knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly
incorporate expected wages into an empirical framework, which
jointly models unemployment duration and reservation wages.
Our empirical results suggest that the introduction of WFTC had
a positive influence on expected wages, which in turn were posi-
tively associated with reservation wages suggesting that it is im-
portant for policy-makers to take account of the effects of changes
in labour market policy on wage expectations.
References
Addison, J., Centeno,M., Portugal, P., 2010. Unemployment benefits and reservation:
key elasticities from a stripped-down job search approach. Economica 77 (305),
46–59.
Blackaby, D.H., Latreille, P., Murphy, P.D., O’Leary, N.C., Sloane, P.J., 2007. An analysis
of reservation wages for the economically inactive. Economics Letters 97 (1),
1–5.
10 TheWFTC control is statistically insignificant in the reservation wage equation,
endorsing its validity as an instrument.
S. Brown, K. Taylor / Economics Letters 119 (2013) 276–279 279
Brewer, M., Duncan, A., Shephard, A., Suárez, M., 2006. Did working families tax
credit work? the impact of in-work support on labour supply in Great Britain.
Labour Economics 13, 699–720.
Hogan, V., 2004. Wage aspirations and unemployment persistence. Journal of
Monetary Economics 51, 1623–1643.
Jones, S., 1988. The relationship between unemployment spells and reservation
wages as a test of search theory. Quarterly Journal of Economics 103 (4),
741–765.
Lancaster, T., Chesher, A., 1983. An econometric analysis of reservation wages.
Econometrica 51, 1661–1676.
Mundlak, Y., 1978. On the pooling of time series and cross section data.
Econometrica 46, 69–85.
